"Skyscrapers linked with impending financial crashes"

From the BBC:

There is an "unhealthy correlation" between the building of skyscrapers and subsequent financial crashes, according to Barclays Capital. Examples include the Empire State building, built as the Great Depression was underway, and the current world's tallest, the Burj Khalifa, built just before Dubai almost went bust.

China is currently the biggest builder of skyscrapers, the bank said. India also has 14 skyscrapers under construction.

"Often the world's tallest buildings are simply the edifice of a broader skyscraper building boom, reflecting a widespread misallocation of capital and an impending economic correction," Barclays Capital analysts said. The bank noted that the world's first skyscraper, the Equitable Life building in New York, was completed in 1873 and coincided with a five-year recession. It was demolished in 1912...

That all seems perfectly plausible to me.

By and large, the height and density of buildings are primarily an indicator of relative land values in towns and cities. So you get the highest and densest buildings in the town centre* and then it gets lower and sparser as you move out into the suburbs.

The other thing which sky scrapers indicate is over-inflated egos, and credit bubbles inflate people's egos in the same way as they inflate the selling price of land.

So it's clear why credit bubbles mean more skyscrapers being built; credit bubbles always burst; hey presto, there's your correlation between skyscrapers and recessions.

Or the theory might be complete bunk, who knows?
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* UPDATE, prompted by JT's comment, I refer you to Jason Barr's empirical research looking at the economics of skyscrapers in Manhattan:

One also notices that within the skyline there are distinct “waves” of building heights, with height rising toward the "center". These waves reflect the endogenous relationship between strategic height, land values and agglomeration economies. Corporations need to be near each other to lower their business costs and increase demand, yet they also desire to stand out in the skyline.

Being close is valuable, which is reflected in property values in the center; large land costs, in turn, drives developers to build even higher if they are to get a return on their investment, as well as have their buildings stand out.

He explains that on the one hand, builders want to build as high as possible, to maximise rental income, fair enough. By and large, rental values decline slightly with height (longer lift journeys etc) and construction costs rise disproportionately with height. So there is a cut-off height above which it makes no sense building, but hubris (esp. during a credit boom) makes people want to add a dozen floors too many, and credit booms also lead builders to underestimate the cost of capital tied up in those extra floors.

He can thus identify the "too tall" buildings, and lists the top fifteen "too tall" buildings on page 27. As you'd expect, their construction dates match peaks of the eighteen-year credit cycles, two in 1908-13; seven in 1926 - 1933; then a bit of a gap for WW2 which threw the cycles out of kilter (or dampened the one which would have happened in the late 1940s); two in 1960 - 61; three in 1972 - 77; and an odd one out in 1987.